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Charitable Organizations
And Federal Taxation*
Franklin C. Latcham
IN TIMES OF heavy government spending and huge revenue bills, it is
inevitable that harried legislators and weary taxpayers should cast about
for new sources for tax dollars. One new source under attention has been
those non-profit organizations traditionally exempted from income taxa-
tion under Section 101 of the Internal Revenue Code. That is, or-
ganizations such as educational institutions, hospitals, mutual savings
banks, and farm cooperatives.
In the Revenue Act of 1950,1 Congress more narrowly defined the
tax-exempt status of cer-
tain of these organizations,
THE AUTHOR (B.S., 1943, IL.B., 1944, Urn- particularly in regard to
versity of Washington; J.S.D., 1951, Yale Urn- certain "business activi-
versity) is an Associate Professor of Law at ties." The principal or-
Western Reserve University. He has published a t t h
articles in the University of Pennsylvania and garuzations with which
University of Washington law reviews and in Congress was concerned
the Yale Law Journal. were charitable organiza-
tions exempted under Code
Section 101 (6). The
Revenue Act of 1951 has added a few amendments to the 1950 Act and,
further, has limited the exempt status of certain other organizations such
as farm cooperatives and mutual savings banks.2 This article, however, is
primarily interested in the present tax-exempt status of charitable orgam-
zations as defined by the present Internal Revenue Code.3 Therefore,
references in this article will be principally to the 1950 Act.
*This article is a revision of Chapter III, Part 2, of MODERNmZING THE FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (1951), a thesis submitted by the writer in paral com-
pletion of work required for the J.S.D. degree at Yale Law School.
'Pub. L No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., approved Sept. 23,1950. It marks the pass-
age of the bill introduced as H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
'Pub. L No. 183, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., approved October 20, 1951. It marks the
passage of the bill introduced as H.R. 4473, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. Henceforth the
two revenue acts will merely be cited as the Revenue Act of 1950, or 1951, or the
1950, or 1951, Act.
'For other discussions of these problems under the 1950 Act see Eaton, Charitable
Foundations and Related Matters Under the 1950 Revenue Act, 37 VA. L. Rlv. 1, and
253 (1951); Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE
LJ. 851 (1951); Note, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback Transactions, 60 YALE L.J.
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The attack upon the "business activities" of charitable organizations
has been accompanied by considerable fanfare, but little factual evidence.4
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1950, charitable orgamzations were under
fire because of two types of activities engaged in by some organizations.
First, they were criticized because of investment policies: their purchase
and operation of commercial enterprises, and their participation in a num-
ber of sale and leaseback transactions. Second, instances arose where funds
of the organization were allegedly being used primarily for the benefit of
those controlling the organization, rather than for charitable beneficiaries.
An example of the operation of a commercial business by a charitable
organization may be found in the case of the C. F. Mueller Co., acquired
for the benefit of the Law School of New York University.5 Friends and
alumni of the law school purchased all the outstanding stock of the com-
pany (which manufactures macaroni and allied products), formed a
charitable corporation, and merged the old corporation into it. The pur-
chase was made by borrowing money from lending institutions. The loan
is to be repaid out of the company's net profits, and after the loan has
been liquidated all profits will go to the law school. It will be noted here
that the company is not owned directly by the university, but by a so-called
"feeder corporation," the charter of which requires net profits to be dis-
tributed to the law school of the university. A number of Tax Court and
Circuit Court cases arising before the 1950 Act have held such organiza-
tions to be tax-exempt." The Tax Court, however, denied exemption to
the present C. F. Mueller Co. But its decision was reversed by the Third
Circuit.7 Congress has recently declared that in cases where the "feeder
879 (1951); Hilinski, Some Comments on the Revenue Act of 1950, 99 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 455, 610 (1951); Lowndes, The Revenue Act of 1950, 29 N. C. L. REV.
111 (1951).
'See note 10, snfra.
5 For the factual background of this transaction see C. F. Mueller Co., 14 T.C. 922
(1950), Rev'd, 190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951). Aside from the Mueller Co., New
York University controls the Ramsey Corp., a manufacturer of piston rings, the
American Lmsoges China Co., and the Howes Leather Co. See testimony of John
Gerdes in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revisons
1947-48, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 3529, 3540 (1948)
'See inter alia, Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2nd Cir. 1938);
Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945), 86 F. Supp. 568
(N.D. Ala. 1949), Aff'd, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950); Sand Springs Home, 6 B.T.A.
198 (1927); and cases discussed in Latcham, Private Charitable Foundations: Some
Tax and Policy Implications, 98 U. or PA. L. REv. 617, 632 (1950)
' See note 5, supra. Despite the Third Circuit's reversal in the Mueller case, the
Tax Court reaffirmed its position regarding the tax status of "feeder organizations"
in Joseph B. Eastman Corp., 16 T.C. No. 187 (June 29, 1951). And in United
States v. Community Services, Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951) the court held a
"feeder organization" non-exempt under INT. REv. CODE § 1462(b) (8), (Social
Security Act), the language of which is the same as INT. REv. CODE § 101 (6).
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corporation's" net income inured to an educational institution, this income
is exempt from tax as far as years prior to 1951 are concerned.8
Although educational institutions have received the most publicity in
regard to owning or controlling tax-exempt business enterprises, they ate
not the only ones interested in such investments. Before the 1950 Act
not a few taxpayers and their counsel were considering the formation of a
family-controlled charitable foundation to purchase a business owned by
the family. Under this plan the vendors could be paid for their interests
from the foundation's tax-free income. And the family would still con-
trol the business through their control of the foundation. In spite of the
claimed advantages in these transactions, however, accurate figures show-
mg the extent to which charitable organizations in general own commer-
cial enterprises directly or indirectly are not available.10
A sale and leaseback transaction usually involves a sale of land and
buildings to an investor, generally a university or life insurance company,
with the investor inmediately executing a long.term lease in favor of the
vendor. The lease usually contains an option to renew the lease or to re-
purchase the property. And the rental payments are generally sufficient
to insure the repayment during the original leasehold period of the full
amount of the purchase price, plus a sum which is somewhat in excess of
interest rates on a loan of a similar amount.11
8Revenue Act of 1951,.§ 601.
'Latcham, Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Considerations, 98
U. Or PA. L. REv. 617, 619 (1950).
The Treasury presented its figures to Congress in executive session because the in-
formation was taken from returns. Treasury officials admitted, however, that their
information was incomplete since not all charitable organizations have been required
to file informational returns. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1950, before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1950). The
Treasury estimated that the revenue which would be gained from " the proposals
for taxing unrelated business activities and the charitable trusts and foundations
would amount on an annual basis to approximately $100,000,000." Id. at 175.
Apparently the tax on unrelated business income would account for the majority
of this revenue. A survey conducted by the American Council on Education is in
violent contrast to the Treasury's estimate. The Council found that for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1947, 455 colleges and universities received gross income of
$150,000,000 from sources other than tuition, governmental grants, gifts, and in-
vestment income. Only $12,000,000 of this amount represents net income, the
Council estimated. Id. at 572, and see the review of this material in Comment,
supra note 3, 60 YALE L J. 851-2. Of course, the Council's survey does not include
all colleges and universities, nor does it include other organizations exempt under
INT. REv. CODE § 101(1), (6), and (7). But there is a vast difference between
the revenue potential of the two estimates. Writers in popular periodicals side with
the Treasury's estimate, or go even beyond. See e.g., The Abuse of Tax Exemption,
FORTUNE, May, 1950, p. 74; Mezerik, The Foundation Racket, NEw REPUBLIC,
Jan. 30, 1950, p. 11.
'The type of financing has received extensive discussion. See Cary, Corporate Fi-
nancing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax and Policy Con-
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Some writers and businessmen see genuine business advantages for the
vendor in sale and leaseback transactions. For example, a business may ob-
tain the equivalent of a loan based upon the full market value of its real
property, instead of only two-thirds of that value as under the ordinary
mortgage, and yet not be under the restraints usually imposed by a corporate
mortgage."2 And there may be definite tax advantages to the vendor. He
may be allowed a loss deduction upon the sale of the real property. Fur-
thermore, he may be able to deduct the full amount of the rental payments
under the leaseback, rather than be restricted to depreciation deductions
upon the buildings alone. Against these advantages, of course, must be
weighed the loss of the title to the property.i3
The principal attack against the sale and leaseback transaction has not
been levied at tax advantages enjoyed by the vendor, but against participa-
tion in the transaction by exempt organizations. Of course, if a university
sulerations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1950); Seale, What is New Regarding Sales to
Charities and Other Exempt Organizations? 8 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDEMAL
TAXATION 930 (1950); Eaton, Charitable Foundations, Tax Avoidance and Bus-
ness Expedience, 35 VA. L. REV. 809, 987 (1949); McPherson, Some Economic and
Legal Aspects of the Purchase and Lease of Real Estate by Life Insurance Companies,
97 U. OF PA. L lRnv. 482 (1949); Note, Taxation of Sale and Lease-Back Transac-
tions, 61 YALE L J. 879 (1951); Comment, Some Economic and Legal Aspects of
Leaseback Transactions, 34 VA. L REV. 686 (1948); Cannon, Danger Signals to
Accountants in "Net Lease" Financing, 85 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 312 (1948);
Blodgett, Taxation of Business Conducted by Charitable Organizations, 4 N.Y.U.
INsTTuTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 418 (1946). Congress has also investigated
the problem in Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1950, supra note 10 at 494, 500,
554, 571, 577; Hearings on Tax Exempt Organizations Other Than Cooperatives
before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1947).
" Some of the other business advantages which selling concerns are said to derive
through this method of financing are: (1) they may more readily procure "piece-
meal financing" by utilizing this device (i.e., funds may be obtained for constructing
one building at a time in an expansion program rather than having to secure a large
loan at one time); and (2) they may maintain a better credit standing through a
sale and leaseback transaction than through other forms of debt financing. See, gen-
erally, Cary supra note 11, 62 HARV. L REV. 1, 5-11; Eaton, supra note 11, 35
VA. L. REv. 987, 1015, Note, supra note 11, 34 VA. L Rv. 686, 691, McPherson,
supra note 11, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 482, 486, Cannon, supra note 11, 85 J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY 312. These authors question the second advantage since it is based
on the accounting practice of showing only the present year's rent as a liability on the
balance sheet and not the capitalized amount of the lease. Of course, the leaseback
does improve the selling firm's credit standing by exchanging a fixed asset for a
current asset, but a heavy debt responsibility is also undertaken which must be con-
sidered. Good accounting practice should at least require the transaction to be rec-
ognized in the already overworked footnote to the balance sheet. See McPherson,
supra note 11, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 482, 486; AccoUNmcG RESEARcH BULLETIN
No. 38, COMMrITEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMER. IN Ti. OF ACCOUNT-
ANTS (Oct., 1948).
"See articles cited supra note 11 for discussions of the tax problems of the vendor,
and May Department Stores Co., 16 T. C. 547 (1951); Century Electric Co., 192
F. 2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).
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purchases with its own funds the real property of a business, and then
leases the property back to the original owner, there would seem to be no
objection to the transaction. The renting of real property has long been
a recognized source of investment of charitable organizations.14 Criticism
of the leaseback transaction has not been aimed primarily at this manner
of concluding the transaction, but against the practice followed by a few
exempt organizations (principally universities) of borrowing money to
obtain the purchase price. Probably the most spectacular instance of this
variation of the leaseback transaction is that entered into between Allied
Stores, Inc., and a subsidiary organized and wholly owned by Union Colt
lege.ii Allied sold substantially all its real estate, buildings and equip-
men to Union for $16,150,000. Union immediately leased the property
to Allied for a thirty year term with an option to renew for a second
thirty year period. Union borrowed $16,000,000 of the purchase price
from a bank and an insurance company. It was contemplated that the
loans would be completely repaid from the rental income within thirty
years.
The problem of the alleged diversion of a charitable organization's
funds for the benefit of those in control was highlighted by the Textron
affair.'6 Here a group of charitable trusts were controlled by persons in-
terested in the expansion of the textile empire of Textron, Inc. The pnn-
cipal and income of these trusts were devoted for a period of time princ-
pally to the expansion of Textron, Inc, through participation by the trusts
in the purchase from and sale to Textron of securities and other properties.
' It has been argued, however, that leasebacks are generally unfair because its ex-
emption permits a charitable organization to pay more for the property than would
a non.exempt investor, and to take back larger rental payments, thus allowing the
vendor larger deductions. See Hearings on Revenue Revwsson, supra note 10 at 214.
No facts have been adduced, however, to support such an argument. One investiga-
tor found in 1948 that exempt organizations were charging higher rates than they
received in interest on comparable loans. See Cary, supra note 11, 62 HAIv. L. Rnv.
1, 8; and also McPherson, supra note 11 at 482. See further the testimony of King
E. Fauver, appearing for Oberlin College, in Hearings on Revenue Revision, supra
note 10 at 554.
"For a more detailed description of this transaction see Cary, supra note 11, 62
HAR. L REv. 1, 3 et seq.
" The growth of Textron, Inc. is a phenomenal tale. It rose from a company with a
modest net worth of $1,765,000 and net sales of $8,000,000 in 1941 to a concern
with an estimated $80,000,000 of net sales and net worth of $40,000,000 in 1950.
The importance of the charitable trusts in this vast expansion program is difficult
to appraise from available facts. But their significant aid at crucial periods is readily
apparent. Congressional investigations of Textron may be found in Hearings before
the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); the subcommittee's report, SEN. REP. No. 101, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); and Hearings on Revenue Revision, supra note 10 at 506-
554. Among the law review discussions see, Eaton, Charitable Foundations, Tax
Avoidance and Business Expediency, 35 VA. L. REv. 809, 987 (1949), Charitable
1951]
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Little other evidence is available of similar use of charitable organizations
by persons controlling them. Evidence has appeared, however, that a rela-
tively large number of private foundations are being established by
wealthy or moderately wealthy individuals. As distinguished from the
older, well-known foundations such as those established by Carnegie and
Rockefeller, little public information has been available on these new or-
gamzations. Suspicions have been aroused that most of these recent foun-
dations are doing little charitable work, but are serving principally as
havens for tax-free funds under the management of the creator and his
family.1? Certainly this situation was easily possible under the Code prior
to the Revenue Act of 1950, for there was no requirement that a charita-
ble organization ever distribute any of its income. And the donor and
his family could continue to control the organization, even to the extent of
paying salaries and annuities to family members."'
In the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress attempted to solve each of the
problems outlined above. The "unrelated business net income" of a
charitable organization earned through its direct operation of a commer-
cial enterprise is subjected to tax under the Act.19 The so-called "feeder
organizations" are denied exemption under the Act and their incomes,
therefore, are fully subject to tax.20  The rental payments received by a
charitable organization under a sale and leaseback are also subjected to tax
under the Act, where the organization has borrowed funds to secure the
purchase price."1 Finally an attempt is made under the Act to prohibit
the use of charitable organizations for the private ends of those in control
and the unlimited accumulation of income by such organizations, and to
supply some public information on the work of these organizations by per-
mitting public inspection of their informational returns. 22
Foundations and Related Matters under the 1950 Revenue Act, 37 VA. L. REv. 1,
273 (1950); Comment, The Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A Critique and a
Proposal, 59 YALE L. J. 477, 492 (1950) The Textron case has also received at-
tenton from popular periodicals. See, e.g., Fiester, Taxes, Dynasties, and Charity,
168 NAToN 414 (1949); Hepner, Nashua Story, HARPERS, Feb., 1949, p. 74;
FORTUNE, May, 1947, p. 133; Id., Aug., 1947, p. 108.
"' See articles cited supra note 14, and Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for
Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. REV. 182, 183 (1948); How to Have Your Own
Foundation, FORTUNE, Aug., 1947, p. 108.
" See Latcham, supra note 6 at 623 et seq. Cf. The Cummins-Collins Foundation,
15 T.C. 613 (1950)
'Revenue Act of 1950, § 301, adding INT. REV. CODE § 421-424, and amending
INT. REV. CODE § 101; Revenue Act of 1950, § 321(a), adding INT. REV. CODE
§ 162(g) (1). See also Revenue Act of 1951, §§ 339, 347, 348, and 601.
'Revenue Act of 1950, § 301(b), amending INT. REV. CODE, § 101; Revenue Act
of 1951, § 601.
' Revenue Act of 1950, § 301 (a), adding INT. REV. CODE § 422 and 423; Revenue
Act of 1950, § 321, adding INT. REV. CODE § 162(g) (1).
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We shall consider the substance of the Act, following the outline of
its provisions as given in the previous paragraph. Next an attempt will
be made to evaluate the policy determinations of Congress and to test the
merits of those determinations.
1. Taxing the "Business Income" of Charitable Organizations and Other
Institutions Exempt Under the Code.
The provisions of the 1950 Act with which we are here concerned at-
tempt to do the following things: (1) to define an "unrelated business
activity" of a charitable or other exempt organization; (2) to determine
the organization's "unrelated business net income" from such activity; and
(3) to apply the corporate income tax rates, or in some cases (if a trust)
the personal income tax rates, against such net income. Generally speak-
ing, under the Act a charitable organization is engaged in an unrelated
business activity if it operates a commercial enterprise, or if it derives rent
under a leaseback transaction where the lessor has borrowed money to
purchase the property. But general definitions are easy. One of the real
difficulties under the Act comes when one attempts to determine whether
specific transactions are unrelated business activities. The difficulty in-
heres in the Act because of the Congressional policy determination that
certain types of investment by charitable organizations in income produc-
ing activities are permissible and certain types of investment are not. The
following paragraphs will largely be devoted to the understanding of the
attempt by Congress to make this distinction dear.
The new provisions taxing unrelated business income are numbered
Sections 421 through 426 of the Code. Because they are inserted in lieu
of the obsolete provisions of Supplement U of the Code,23 the new sections
are referred to in the Committee Reports to the 1950 Act as the "Supple-
ment U Tax." They are generally effective for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1950.24
A. Organizations Subject to Tax Under the Act.
In this article we are concerned solely with charitable organizations,
but the 1950 Act makes the Supplement U tax applicable to organizations
exempt under Code Sections 101(1) (labor, agricultural, and horticul-
'Revenue Act of 1950, § 321, adding INT. REV. CODE § 162(g) (2), Revenue
Act of 1950, § 331, adding INT. REv. CODE §§ 3813, 3814; Revenue Act of 1950,
§ 341, adding INT. REV. CODE § 153.
'
3Prior to this Act, Supplement U related to abatement of tax for members of the
armed forces upon death. But this Supplement expired by its own terms and has
no relation with the new Supplement U. SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
105 (1950).
"' Revenue Act of 1950, § 303. See also enfra p. 118. The Treasury had not adopted
regulations to the Supplement U tax at the date this article was sent to the printers
(Dec. 13, 1951).
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rural organizations), 101(6) (charitable, scientific, literary, educational,
and religious organizations, other than a church or a convention or as-
sociation of churches, and organizations for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals), 101(7) (business leagues, chambers of commerce,
real estate boards, and boards of trade), and 101(14) (corporations or-
ganized for the exclusive purpose of holding ttle to real property and
turning over their income to one of the above listed organizations or to a
church or a convention or association of churches) 25 The new taxing
sections also apply to any trust which, except for Supplement U, is exempt
from taxation under Section 101 (6), and which, if it were not for such
exemption, would be subject to tax under Supplement E.26 Organiza-
tons exempt under Sections 101 (1) and 101 (7) apparently were brought
within the scope of the new legislation because of the fear that these or-
ganizations might be utilized for the operation of business enterprises in
the future. There was no evidence before Congress that such exempt or-
ganizations owned any commercial enterprises at that time.27 Congress
apparently believed that other organizations exempt under Section 101
would not be likely subjects for the control of a commercial enterprise.
This is perhaps true except for organizations exempt under Section
101(9) (clubs organized and operated exdusively for pleasure, recrea-
tion, and other nonprofit purposes) They have already been engaged
in a number of cases involving alleged profit-making operations.28 And
there has been at least one similar case under Section 101(8) (civic
leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively
for the promotion of social welfare) "9 In an effort for completeness, at
least organizations exempt under these paragraphs of Section 101 should
be subjected to the new tax. Congress did not see fit to make such an
amendment in the 1951 Act although under the Act building and loan
associations, cooperative banks, mutual savings banks, and cooperatives
will be subject to the corporate income tax, generally, on their retained
earnings.30 And furthermore, the unrelated business income of state col-
leges and universities will be subject to the Supplement U tax.3 '
=INT. REv. CODE § 421(b) (1), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
INT. REv. CODE § 421(b) (2), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
See Journal of Accountancy, 16 B.T.A. 1260 (1929).
See, e.g., Jockey Club v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1935); West Side Ten-
nis Club v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940); Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n
Sokol v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1945).
' Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945).
'Revenue Act of 1950, §§ 313, 314.
'Revenue Act of 1951, § 339, amending INT. REV. CODE § 421(b). The tax will
apply whether the business is operated directly by the university or through a wholly-
owned subsidiary. Congressional intent, of course, was to equalize the tax burden
as between privately owned educational institutions and those owned by the state.
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It will be noted that the Act continues the exemption of the income
of churches, or a convention or association of churches, 2 even though
income is from unrelated business activies-a possibility Congress ap-
parendy believed unlikely.33 The word "church" is to be strictly con-
strued, however, for the Committee Reports state that "religious organiza-
tions" and charitable educational organizations under church auspices are
subject to the Supplement U tax. Similarly, as indicated above, the new
tax will also apply to a Section 101(14) corporation holding property for
a church, or a convention or association of churches a3
All organizations when taxed are subject to tax at the corporate in-
come tax rates- with one important exception: trusts are taxable at the
individual income tax rates.3 5
It is apparently the intent of Congress to tax the unrelated business
income of charitable trusts at the individual rates because a private trust
is taxed at the individual rates where its income is not distributed to bene-
ficiaries. As a policy matter, however, there would seem to be no rea-
son for taxing charitable trusts without private beneficiaries at a different
rate from that applicable to charitable corporations. Unless Congress
eliminates this discrimination against charitable trusts, persons creating
charitable organizations should consider the tax advantages of the cor-
porate form of organization.
B. Taxng Unrelated Bustness Net Income.
The Supplement U tax applies only to the "unrelated business net in-
come" of an organization. Section 422 (a), added to the Code by the
1950 Act, defines "unrelated business net income" as ". the gross in-
The constitutional problem of inter-governmental immunities is raised by the amend-
ment, but it is probably constitutional. See South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 54 Sup. Ct.
725 (1934); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 66 Sup. Ct. 310 (1948),
and compare Bear Gulch Water Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 975 (9th Cit. 1941).
See, further, INT. REV. CODE, § 116(d); G.C.M. 13745, XIII-2 Cum.Bull. 76
(1934); G.C.M. 14407, XIV-1 Cum.Bull. 103 (1935); I.T. 2886, XIV-1 Cum.BuUL
103 (1935).
"The Senate Bill added the words "a convention or association of churches" because
it was pointed out to the committee that in " some denominations each local
church is autonomous and that as a result, the central association or convention might
not be exempted " SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 28 (1950).
" No testimony was given of churches, as such, engaged in business activity. But see
Eaton, supra note 3; 37 VA. L. REv. 1, 20, Note 205.
'SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1950); HR. REP. No. 2319, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950). Compare INT. REV. CODE § 101(18), (hereinafter
these reports will be referred to sunply as SEN. REP. and H.R. REP.)
'INT. REv. CODE §§ 162(g), 421 (b) (2), added by Revenue Act of 1950 §§ 301,
321.
" INT. REV. CODE § 421 (c).
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come derived by an organization from any unrelated trade or business
regularly carried on by it " less the Section 23 deductions which are
directly connected with the operation of such trade or business. Thus
we must also define an "unrelated trade or business regularly carried
on by "an organization, and this will be considered under the next
heading.
(1). Unrelated Trade or Busness Defined.
First, what is "regular" as opposed to "sporadic" business activity?
The Committee Reports illustrate the difference between the two concepts
by citing an occasional dance to which the public is charged admission as
a sporadic activity, whereas the operation of a public parking lot, if for
only one day a week, would be a regular business activity.37 Continuity
is the touchstone for decision.
But after such continuity of operation is established, other require-
ments for liability to taxation must be present. The organization must be
engaged in a "trade or business," a phrase which the Committee Reports
state has the same meaning here as it does elsewhere in the Code. The
Committee Reports should have added, however, that it is a phrase which
has never been adequately defined under the Code." But more inportant
than determining the meaning of this phrase, is the finding of the scope
of the further requirement that the trade or business be "unrelated." The
general definition given by new Code Section 422 (b) is not very helpful.
An unrelated trade or business, according to the new section, is one not
substantially related to the organization's exempt purposes, aside from the
need of such organization for income or funds. But the new section does
list three instances where business activity is "related." The first is where
substantially all the work in carrying on the business is performed without
compensation to employees.39 The second is that of a business operated
by a Section 101(6) organization primarily for the convenience of its
members, students, patients, officers, or employees. 0 The third is that of
selling merchandise, substantially all of which has been donated to the
organization - the instance of the so-called "thrift-shop."4
3, SEN. REP. 106-7; H.R. REP. 109.
'Compare Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363 (1940) with Motch
v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 859 (6th Cir., 1950) and Faclder v. Commissioner, 133
F.2d 509 (6th Cir., 1943) See also cases cited note 62 flfra.
"The Committee Reports give the example of an orphanage operating a second-
hand store through employees who volunteer to work without compensation. SEN.
REP. 108; H.R. REP. 110.
"An example would be a laundry operated by a college to launder dormitory linen
and the dothing of students. SEN. REP. 109; H.R. REP. 110. Compare Trinidad
v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 44 Sup. Ct 204 (1924).
"SEN. REP. 29. This example of a "related" business was added by the Senate Bill,
H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., as passed by the Senate.
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It should be noted here, furthermore, that the income from certain re-
search activities is not taxable, although .Section 422 does not list these
activities as those of a related trade or business. Rather, the section states
that such income shall be excluded in determining unrelated business net
income. Thus all income is excluded when derived from research for the
United States, or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or for any state,
or its political subdivsons.42 Similarly, there shall be no tax upon the
income received by a college, university, or hospital for "research per-
formed for any person."43  And this exclusion likewise applies to an or-
ganization operated primarily for the purposes of carrying on fundamental
research the results of which are freely available to the general public 4
Other than these examples, we must rely on the Committee Reports,
and the regulations when they appear, for a more concrete definition of
an unrelated trade or business. According to the Committee Reports, "
the operation of a wheat farm by an exempt agricultural college would
not be considered an unrelated business. Nor would the income from
charging admissions to athletic activities of a college; nor would the in-
come from a university press "in the ordinary case."4 6 All these acvities
are "substantially related" to the purposes of the college or university. This
would not be true, however, of the manufacture and sale by a college of
automobile tires. The fact that the college makes some "incidental use"
of the tire business such as having some students perform minor clerical
or bookkeeping functions as part of their educational program would not
make the tire business a "related" activity4 Presumably, if a substantial
part of the employees were students working without compensation, the
income would be exempt.48
(2). Exceptions and Limitations to the Term "Unrelated Business Net
Income."
Once an unrelated trade or business is defined, and its gross income
determined, Section 422 (a) provides further exceptions, limitations, and
"INT. REv. CODE § 422 (a) (7), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
"INT. REV. CODE § 422(a) (8) (A), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
"INT. REV. CODE § 422(a) (8) (B). This provision was added by the House and
Senate Conferees. Conference Report, Statement by the Managers on the Part of
the House, H.R. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 13 (1950), Amendment No.
137. "Research" means fundamental and applied research. H.R. REP. 37.
" SEN. REP. 107; H.R. REP. 109.
"Id. 29; 37. Revenue Act of 1951, § 347, adds to INT. REV. CODE § 422(b) an
amendment relating to the operation of a publishing business. The amendment pro-
vides generally that if the exempt organization operates a publishing business, its
income shall not be taxable if it becomes a "related" business within three years
from the taxable year. The amendment is applicable to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1950 and prior to January 1, 1953.
'
T SEN. REP. 107; H.R. REP. 109.
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additions which must be considered. Thus the income of an organization
from dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, and, in general, rents from
real property, and the deductions directly connected therewith, are ex-
cluded from the concept of unrelated business net income.4 9 Whether
or not these exclusions necessarily imply that the investment activities of
an exempt organization giving rise to such types of income are "unrelated
business activities" is unimportant, apparently, to a construction of Section
422. But the exclusions do point up the illogic of the unfair competition
argument. If a tax-exempt organization can be an unfair business com-
petitor, it can also compete unfairly as an investor. The distinction be-
tween "business" income and "investment" income is further sharpened
by the comments on these exclusions in the Committee Reports. "0 Rents
from real property (including personal property leased therewith) are
not taxed, but rents from the "business" of renting personal property are
taxed. Similarly, rent from real property does not include income earned
from the operation of a hotel, but does include rental payments received
from the lease of the hotel. And, even more illogically, income from the
operation of a business is taxed, but income received in the form of inter-
est upon overdue open accounts receivable is not taxed.
Section 422 also excludes from the scope of "unrelated business net
income" all gains or losses upon the sale, exchange, or other disposition of
property other than stock in trade or property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.51
This section also provides special limitations upon allowing the net
operating loss 52 and charitable contribution 3 deduction in the case of an
organization receiving unrelated business net income. Provision is fur-
ther made for computing unrelated business net income where an orgam-
" INT. REV. CODE § 422 (b) (1), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
"INT. REv. CODE § 4 22(a) (1),(2),(3),(4), added by Revenue Act of 1950,
§ 301. Paragraph (4) specifically includes as taxable gross income, rental payments
received under a Supplement U lease, discussed mifra p. 111.
10 SEN. REP. 108; H.R. REP. 110.
1INT. REv. CODE § 4 22(a) (5), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301. This para-
graph does not apply to the cutting of standing timber for sale or for use in the tax-
payer's trade or business, which is considered a sale or exchange under § 117 (k) (1).
"Other disposition" includes an involuntary conversion such as a theft or destruction
of the property. SEN. REP. 108; H.R. REP. 110.
2 INr. REv. CODE § 422(a) (6), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
"'INT. REv. CODE § 422(a) (9) (A),(B), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
In the case of an organization taxed at the corporate rates under § 421(b) (1), the
charitable deduction afforded by § 23 (q) is allowed, limited to five per cent of the
organization's unrelated business net income. Trusts taxed at the individual rates
under § 421(b) (2) are allowed the deduction afforded by § 23(o), limited to
fifteen per cent of unrelated business net income. In both cases the contribution
must be made to an organization other than that of the contributor. SEN. REP. 109;
H.R. REP. 111.
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zation is a member of a partnership if the business of the partnership is an
unrelated trade or business with respect to such orgatuzauon."4
The 1951 Act adds a special deduction from "unrelated business net
income" where two or more educational Institutions are engaged as part-
ners in an unrelated business acquired before January 1, 1950. If such
are the facts the partners are permitted to deduct for the years 1951 to
1953, inclusive, amounts used or irrevocably set aside within the tax year
to pay for a business acquired before January 1, 1950.15
C. Taxing the Income of "Feeder Organmzations"
It should be emphasized that the above sections dealing with unrelated
business net income have no application to the so-called "feeder organi-
zations" of the C. F. Mueller Co. type. Under Section 301 (b) of the 1950
Act, they are sunply declared to be non-exempt organizations, and are,
therefore, subject to taxation as ordinary corporations or trusts. Of course,
dividends or gifts from the "feeder orgamzation" to the parent charitable
institution would not be taxed to the parent as Supplement U income since
these items are expressly excluded under the Code from taxable gross in-
come." As we have seen, the 1951 Act has solved the pre-1951 tax status
of "feeder organizations" where their net income is payable to educational
institutions by declaring them exempt 7
D. Taxng the Income from a Leaseback Transaction
We have noted before that exempt organizations were criticized be-
fore Congress, and elsewhere, not only for operating commercial enter-
prises, but also for investing through so-called sale and leaseback transac-
tions. Congress has attempted to solve the problem under the Act by
defining rental income from a specified type of lease or leaseback as tax-
able unrelated business net income. Such a lease or leaseback is called by
the Act a "Supplement U lease." Again, only those organizations exempt
under Code Sections 101(1), 101(6), 101(7), and 101(14) are subject
to tax on such rental income."'
What is a "Supplement U lease"? It is defined generally as a lease of
SINT. REv. CODE § 4 22(a), last sentence. See also SEN. REP. 109; H.R. REP. 111.
'Revenue Act of 1951, § 348, amending INT. REV. CODE § 422(a). The House
iserted this section of the 1951 Act in place of § 348 of the Act as passed by the
Senate. (H.R. 4473, as passed by the Senate on September 28, 1951). See CON-
PERENCE REpoRT, H.R. REP. No. 1179, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Amendment No.
101, pp. 17, 51. Section 348 of the Senate Bill would have deferred the tax on un-
related business net income of educational insutions until tax years beginning after
January 1, 1954.
" INT. REv. CODE § 4 22(a) (1), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301(A), and
INT. REv. CODE § 22(b) (5)
See note 8 supra and supporting text
See notes 25 and 26 supra and supporting text.
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real property for a term of more than five years by one of these organiza-
tions, if at the close of the lessor's taxable year there is an unpaid indebted-
ness respecting the property as defined by Section 423(b) '9 (The in-
debtedness is termed by the Act a "Supplement U lease indebtedness.")
Again, as we have seen before the chief criticism of the sale and lease-
back transaction was that exempt organizations were borrowing money
to purchase the property and paying the purchase price out of the rental
income. And so Congress has specified that there must be an unpaid bal-
ance on the purchase price for rental income to be taxable.
The general definition of a Supplement U lease, however, is subject to
a number of exceptions. In the first place, it applies only to leases of
real property, a term including personal property if it is leased in connec-
tion with the real property. 0 Thus, the income from the following trans-
action might be tax-free to a college: assume the college purchases an ex-
pensive machine on an installment contract, leases it to a factory, and
pays the purchase price out of the rental payments; 1 provided that the
machine can be classified as personal property and not as a fixture, the
lease would not be a Supplement U lease. But the rental income might
nevertheless be taxable as unrelated business net income under Section
422. Rent from personal property is not exempt under Section 422 (a).
And there is an excellent chance that the college would be held to have
entered a "trade or business" '2 unrelated to the performance of its exempt
purposes.8 3
A second exception involves the term of the lease: it must be for more
than five years. In computing the term, however, the period for which a
lease may be extended or renewed by reason of an option is considered a
part of the term.6 A three year lease renewable for a like period is con-
sidered a six year lease from its inception.65 Even a one year lease with
an option to renew for one year would be included within the definition
where the parties renew each year, but only at the mception of the fifth
"INT. Ruv. CODE § 423(a), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
° INT. REV. CODE § 423 (c), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
For descriptions of similar transactions, see Blodgett, TAXATION OF BUSINESSES
CONDUCTED BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONs, N.Y.U. FOURTH ANNUAL INSTI-
TT ON FEDERAL TAXATION 418 (1946).
See Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943) (attorney owning an
apartment house held in trade or business); Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372 (1946) acq.
(attorney renting former residence in trade or business in regard to the property).
See further, N. Stuart Campbell, 5 T.C. 272 (1945) acq. Compare Deputy v. Du-
Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363 (1940).
' INT. REV. CODE § 422 (b), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301. See discussion
supra p. 108.
, INT. REV. CODE § 423 (a), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
'SEN. REP. 110; H.R. REP. 112.
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year. The lease would then have been effective for five years and there
would be an option for a sixth year."" If property is acquired subject to a
lease, the term of the lease is stated to begin on the date of acquisition.'I
The "substantially related purpose" clause forms a third exception.
Section 423 (a) eliminates from the definition of a Supplement U lease
any lease entered into primarily for a purpose substantially related to the
organizaton's exempt functions. The Senate Committee Report gives as
an example a case where a hospital leases a clinic to an association of doc-
tors if the lease is made for purposes substantially related to carrying
on hospital functions. 8 As a corollary to this exception, Section 423 (a)
also states that a lease of premises in a building primarily designed for oc-
cupancy by the organization shall not be considered a Supplement U
lease.
The case of a "split lease' provides the final exception or limitation.
Thus if a portion of the premises is leased to one tenant for a term of
more than five years and to another for a term of less than five years, what
portion of the rental income, if any, will be subject to taxation? Under
Section 423 (a) only the income from leases of more than five years if
subject to tax, and only under one of the two following conditions. First,
the rents obtained from the more-than-five-year leases must represent
fifty per cent or more of the total rents received for the taxable year from
the premises; or the area of the property occupied by tenants under such
leases must represent, at any time during the taxable year, fifty per cent
or more of the total area of the property rented at such tune. Or, second,
the rent derived from any one tenant or a group of tenants 9 specifically
defined by the Act must represent more than 10 per cent of the total rents
derived during the taxable year from the property, or the area occupied by
any one tenant or a group of tenants specifically defined by the Act must
represent at any one time during the taxable year more than 10 per cent
of the total area of the property rented at such time.
(1). Defintown of Spplement TJ Lease Iizdebtediness.
The definition of the Supplement U lease indebtedness is of funda-
mental importance for the debt incurred by the lessor in acquiring the
property subject to the lease has been made the primary basis for taxing
c Ibid.
Or Ibid.
c3 SEN. REP. 111. This exception and the one described in the following sentence
in the text (premises primarily occupied by the exempt organization) were added to
INT. REV. CODE § 423 (a) by the Senate Bill, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., as
passed by the Senate.
'The excepuon applies if a group of tenants who are under more than five year
leases are members of an affiliated group as defined in INT. REv. CODE § 141, or
are partners.
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the rental payments in leaseback transactions. Section 423(b) of the
Code defines "Supplement U lease indebtedness" to mean, with respect to
a lease of real property for more than five years, the unpaid amount of
(1) the indebtedness incurred by the lessor in acquiring or mprov-
ing such property;
(2) the indebtedness incurred prior to the acquisition or improve-
ment of such property, if such indebtedness would not have been incurred
but for such acqusition or improvement; and
(3) the indebtedness incurred subsequent to the acquisition and im-
provement of such property, if such indebtedness would not have been
incurred but for such acquisition or improvement, and the incurrence of
the indebtedness was reasonably foreseeable at the tine of such acquisition
or improvement.
This definition of an indebtedness incurred in a sale and lease transac-
tion attempts to cover not only the traditional purchase of the leased prop-
erty by an exempt organization through a bank or insurance company
loan, but foreseeable variations of that transaction. Thus the indebtedness
comes within the definition if incurred in improving, as well as acquiring,
the property. And, if it is reasonably connected with the acquisition or
improvement of the property, the indebtedness is covered if it was in-
curred at a time before or after such acquisition or improvement. Fur-
thermore, the section defining Supplement U leases reaches cases where
the money is borrowed without placing a mortgage on the leased property.
The Committee Reports give the example of a university which pledges
some of its securities with a bank for a loan to purchase business property
which is leased back to the vendor. The bank loan would constitute a
Supplement U indebtedness incurred prior to the acquisition of the prop-
erty.
70
The new section not only attempts to tax the organization, if through any
means it borrows money to acquire the leased property, but it also taxes the
rental income from the property if the organization acquires property
(whether by gift, devise, or purchase) subject to a mortgage, whether it
assumes the mortgage or not.7 ' Thus if a college is given business prop-
erty subject to a mortgage, which the college does not assume, the rental
income from the property will be subject to tax as long as the mortgage
is in existence. Special exceptions to this rule are provided, however, in
the case of property subject to a mortgage acquired prior to July 1, 1950.72
70 SEN. REP. 112; H.R. REP. 113.
INT. REV. CODE § 423 (b), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
2 Exceptions under INT. REv. CODE § 423 (b), are provided where the property
subject to a mortgage was acquired by gift, devise, or bequest prior to July 1, 1950;
or where the property was acquired prior to that date subject to a lease requiring
improvements upon stated contingencies occurring, and indebtedness is incurred to
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The extension of the tax to the income from rental property subject to a
mortgage where the property is merely donated to an educational institu-
non would seem to be a questionable policy, even if one agrees to the
taxation of leaseback transactions. Certainly a gift of property subject to
a mortgage is a pure windfall to the organization. The fact that the prop-
erty has a mortgage on it has in no way benefited the organization in ob-
tainig the property. Its efforts to pay off the mortgage should not be a
reason for taxation when no tax will apply once the debt is repaid.
Section 423, dealing with Supplement U leases and indebtedness, is
peculiarly important in the case of Section 101(14) subsidiary corpora-
tions. Since the exisung provisions of Section 101(14) require corpora-
tions exempt under it merely to hold property for another exempt orgam-
zation and not to engage in any active business enterprise, the only type
of unrelated business income which such a corporation could have would
be income from a Supplement U lease.73 Corporations exempt under
Section 101(14) are covered by Section 422, defining unrelated business
net income,74 and thus if an exempt organization creates a subsidiary to
hold property subject to a Supplement U lease, the income from the lease
will be taxable to the parent as unrelated business net income.l
(2). Computation of Taxable Supplement U Lease Rents and Deductions.
It has been indicated above that Section 423 provides a formula for
determining the amount of rent received under a Supplement U lease
which is includible in computing the unrelated business net income
for an otherwise exempt organization. The amount of rent to be included
improve the property under the terms of the lease. A similar exception is made where
property under a lease requiring improvements is held by a § 101 (14) corporation,
if all its stock was acquired by an organization described in § 101 (1), (6) or (7)
before July 1, 1950, and more than one-third of the stock was acquired by gift or
bequest. Compare the description of the Union College holding company given
supra note 15, and text which it supports. The reason for choosing July 1, 1950
is not stated in the Committee Reports, and it is not otherwise apparent.
"See SEN. REP. 113; H.R. REp. 113.
TNT. REv. CODE § 421 (b) (1) specifically taxes the Supplement U net income of
a § 101(14) corporation if it is payable to an organization which itself is subject to
tax upon its Supplement U net income.
That the Supplement U net income of the § 101 (14) subsidiary will be taxable to
the parent is not too clear from § 421(b) and (c) and § 422. However, it is a
logical interpretation of the sections, especially § 422(b) (1), and was undoubtedly
intended since taxing the income of each § 101 (14) subsidiary separately would
mean an open invitation to create a number of subsidiaries to hold leases and there-
by reduce taxes, especially of subsidiaries each with an income less than the corporate
surtax exemption of $25,000. Note also the following from Summary of H.R. 8920
ar Agreed to by the Conferees, 96 CONG. REc. 1638, 1646 (September 22, 1950)
"In applying the tax, the bill provides for the consolidation of all an organization's
income from its various unrelated trade or business activities." See also CCH
STANDARD FED. TAx REP., No. 42, pt 1, 88 (1950).
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is "the same percentage (but not in excess of 100 per centum) of the
total rents derived during the taxable year under such lease as (A) the
Supplement U lease indebtedness, at the close of the taxable year, with
respect to the premises covered by such lease is of (B) the adjusted basis,
at the dose of the taxable year, of such premises.!"7
Thus, if a college purchased a building of $500,000 out of its own
funds and leased the building for more than a five year term to a business
concern, the rental payments would not be taxable. If, however, the col-
lege borrowed $200,000 to make the purchase, a percentage of the rental
payments would be taxable according to the amount of the outstanding
debt and the adjusted basis of the property at the close of the taxable year.
Assuming the debt is $200,000 and the adjusted basis $500,000, two-
fifths of the rent will be taxable income. Of course, the adjusted basis of
the premises would have to be changed each year to account for allowable
depreciation, deductions, capital improvements, and other capital adjust-
ments.77 Under the above formula where the adjusted basis is the de-
nominator and the indebtedness the numerator, yearly reduction of the
denominator through depreciation adjustments may result in a higher per-
centage of the rent being taxed in the following year unless the indebted-
ness is also reduced.78
Where only a part of the premises is subject to a Supplement U lease
and there is an outstanding indebtedness with respect to the whole prop-
erty, Section 423(b) provides that an allocation of part of the indebted-
ness must be made to the part of the property subject to the lease. Thus
the adjusted basis of that part of the premises subject to the lease must be
determined. This amount will be the denominator in the above formula.
And to that part of the adjusted basis must be allocated a proportionate
part of the total indebtedness. 79  This amount will be the numerator.
Section 423 also sets forth the deductions which may be taken into
account with respect to a Supplement U lease in computing unrelated
business net income. They include, generally, taxes and other expenses
"INT. REV. CODE § 423 (d) (1), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
"The term "adjusted basis" is defined in INT. REV. CODE § 113(b) (1).
" See SEN. REP. 114; H.R. REP. 115.
'The allocation of the total indebtedness could be accomplished as follows:
Adjusted basis of part of property subject to lease x Total Indebtedness.
Adjusted basis of whole property
The formula for determining the percentage of rent includible in computing
unrelated business net income could be represented as follows:
The amount of the Supplement U lease income
Allocable part of Supplement U lease indebtedness x Rent.
Adjusted basis of Supplement U leased premises
See SEN. REP. 114; H.R. REP. 114.
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recurred with respect to the property, interest on the Supplement U lease
indebtedness, and an allowance for depreciation and obsolescence.8 0 The
sum of the deductions is subject to the same percentage reduction as that
discussed above for determining taxable rental income."' If only a por-
tion of the property is subject to a Supplement U lease, Section 423(d)
provides that only those deductions properly allocable to the part of the
premises covered by the lease may be taken into account.
E. Exemption for Prior Years of Organizations Engaged in Business
Activity.
The Senate Bill to the Act added Section 302, dealing primarily with
the exemption of organizations in past years.8 2 The section was amended
to its present form in conference.83 The first paragraph of Section 302
assures that for years beginning prior to January 1, 1951, no organization
shall be denied exemption under Section 101(1), (6), or (7), merely
because it was during those years deriving income from a trade or business
if this income would not be taxed in future years under the Act as unre-
lated business income, or merely because the income from such trade or
business is rental income from real property8 4  This would not afford
much relief to an organization operating a manufacturing plant for years
prior to January 1, 1950. But the provision would seem to mean, at least,
that rental income from a sale and leaseback shall not be taxed as income
from a trade or business for prior years.8 5
Under the second paragraph of Section 302, the filing of an informa-
tional return (Form 990) is to be considered the filing of a return for the
purpose of starting the three-year period of limitations on the assessment
of deficiencies with respect to organizations which are exempt under Sec-
tion 101 except for the operation of a trade or business. If an organiza-
tion was not required to file an informational return, it will be deemed to
have done so. Tis second provision does not apply, however, in cases
where prior to September 30, 1950, a deficiency has been assessed against
an organization, or taxes have been assessed or paid. 8
The third paragraph of Section 302 assures that an income, estate, or
gift tax charitable deduction for a gift or bequest to an organization prior
to January 1, 1951, will not be denied, if under the limitations of the
SaINT. REv. CoDE § 423(d) (3), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
INT. REv. CoDE § 423 (d) (2), added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 301.
SSEN. REP. 115-119.
'See Summary of H.R. 8920 as agreed to by the Conferees, 96 CONG.REc. 1638,
1646-7 (September 22, 1950).
'Revenue Act of 1950, § 302 (a)
' In regard to other possible bases for taxing the income of a sale and lease-back
transaction, see artides cited supra note 11, and note 13.
'Revenue Act of 1950, § 302(b).
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above first and second paragraphs, the exemption of such organizations
could not be denied.
ST
As has been stated before, Section 303 of the Act makes the sections
taxing unrelated business income applicable only to years beginning after
December 31, 1950. This section also adds a statement of Congressional
intent with respect to the pending litigation involving the exempt status
of so-called "feeder organizations." The effect of the provision is that no
inferences shall be made as to prior years from the fact that the business
income from feeder organizations is specifically taxable under the Act.8
And, in addition, Section 601 of the 1951 Act specifically exempts "feeder
organizations" for years prior to 1951 where their income inured to an
educational institution. 9
2. Lmntatons on Family Control of Chartable Organtzations.
As we have noted, the 1950 Revenue Act, as it affects charitable or-
ganizations may be divided into two grand divisions: (1) sections taxing
the business income of such organizations; and, (2) provisions denying
exemption to such organizations if the grantor or his family retain cer-
tain controls over the administration of the organization.00 Related to
these second provisions is a section limiting the amount of income which
the organization may accumulate,91 and related to both provisions is a
section requiring the organization to file informational returns open to
public inspection.9 2
Insofar as administrative control by the grantor or his family is con-
cerned, the Act does not go far beyond the limitations of prior law. Be-
fore the passage of the 1950 Act, the creator, his family, or associates
could act as trustees and officers of the charitable organization. Reason-
able salaries could be paid by the foundation to employees, including the
creator and members of his family for services performed. Even annuities
payable to private individuals out of the organization's net income were
permissible if the annuities were merely "incidental" to the main charit-
able purposes of the organization. s The further limitations, enunciated
"Revenue Act of 1950, § 302(c).
'On this matter § 303 states specifically- "The determination as to whether an or-
ganization is exempt under § 101 of the Internal Revenue Code from taxation for
any taxable year beginning before January 1, 1951, shall be made as if § 301(b)
of this Act had not been enacted and without inferences drawn from the fact that
the amendment made by such section is not expressly made applicable with respect
to taxable years beginning before January 1, 1951."
'o See note 8 supra.
'Revenue Act of 1950, § 321, 322, 331, adding INT. REV. CODE H8 162(g) and
3813.
"Revenue Act of 1950, §§ 321, 331, adding INT. REv. CODE § 16 2(g) (4) and
3814.
'2 Revenue Act of 1950, § 341, adding INT. Rnv. CODE § 153.
[December
TAXATION OF CHARITIS
by the courts and Treasury as a part of the Clifford doctrine, 4 apply
spedfically to trusts but there is no reason why they could not be applied
to corporations.99 Under these limitations, the grantor is still liable for
tax upon trust income unless certain conditions are met. The trust term
must be for a duration of at least 10 years if the grantor retains a rever-
sionary interest. The grantor, his family, or anyone without a substantial
adverse interest, however, can still control the disposition of income to
charitable beneficiaries. They can hold the power to vote the stock held
in trust, to direct the investment of trust corpus, and to substitute property
of an equivalent value for trust property, if these powers are held in a
fiduciary capacity. But neither the grantor, nor his family, nor anyone
without a substantial adverse interest can hold the power to purchase, or
sell, trust property for less than an adequate consideration. Nor may they
have a power which enables the grantor to borrow trust income or corpus
without the payment of reasonable interest in any case, or, generally, with-
out the giving of adequate security. And, further, the grantor may only
borrow trust corpus or income for periods shorter than one year 8
These limitations left the grantor and his family with broad powers
of control over a foundation.97 Of course, there is the question under the
Clifford regulations of what is a "fiduciary capacity," but as long as the
grantor, or anyone, holds the powers as a trustee, he is presumed to hold
them as a fiduciary. The limitations on sales and purchases, or loans,
between the grantor, his family, and the foundation may be summarized
in the phrase: such transactions must be carried on at arms length. There
is, however, nothing to prevent sales or loans between the trust and the
grantor or members of his family.
The 1950 Act is a step forward in solving the family control problem
if only for the fact that its provisions are directly aimed at meeting the
problem, whereas the cases and regulations forming the Clifford doctrine
do not deal primarily with charitable trusts. The Act is concerned with
prohibiting the same types of condemned admimstrative powers in the
hands of the grantor as the Clifford regulations, although the act does
not require that the power to vote securities of the organization, to direct
investment of those securities, or to substitute the organization's property
for other property of an equivalent value be held in a "fiduciary capac-
ity."9 8 Private charitable corporations exempted by Code Section 101(6)
' Latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. OF PA. L. RLv. 617, 639-643.
"See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940); U.S. TREAs.
REGS. 111, § 29.22(a)-21,22 (the Clifford Regulations).
" Latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. OF PA. L REv. 617, 626-630.
'Id. at 624-626. The limitations enumerated were adopted by the Treasury in the
Clifford Regulations, U.S. TREAS. REGS. 111, § 29.22 (a)-21 (c) -(e).
" latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 617, 623, 624.
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are also specifically covered by the Act. 9 Presumably, the Clifford regu-
lations will still apply to charitable trusts for they are intended to solve a
problem somewhat different from that with which the Act is concerned.
That is, the regulations deal with the issue of when the settlor of a trust
has retained such control over the trust that, for tax purposes, he should
be taxed upon the trust income. The provisions under the Act are con-
cerned with whether the charitable organization is exempt, or not, after
considering the creator's retained powers. The Act would naturally super-
sede the regulations in resolving the exemption problem.
In summary, the Act attempts to control family domination of founda-
tions by defining prohibited transactions and denying exemption to the
organization, and denying charitable deductions to donors of gifts to the
organization, if the prohibited transactions are consummated. The pro-
visions which deny exemption and charitable deductions win be consid-
ered in the following paragraphs -after some preliminary considerations.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Act&00 is only concerned with
completed transactions whereas under the Clifford regulations if a person
has the power to exercise a proscribed power that factor alone is sufficient
to invalidate the trust for tax purposes. Secondly, the Act is broader than
the regulations in that it limits transactions between the organization and
the creator (if a trust), a substantial contributor, members of the family'
of the creator or substantial contributor, or a corporation controlled 0 2
by the creator or substantial contributor. The House Bill went even fur-
ther and regulated transactions between the organization, and its officers
or trustees and their families. 0 3
The first transactions disallowed by the Act are loans by the orgam-
"See Clifford Regulations, I (e).
'Sections 3813 and 3814 of the Code, which define prohibited transactions and
unreasonable accumulations in the case of organizations exempt under section 101
(6), are not applicable to (1) a religious organization (other than a trust); (2) an
educational institution with a regularly maintained faculty, curriculum, and student
body; (3) an organization receiving substantial governmental support; (4) an or-
ganization operated by a religious organization (other than a trust); (5) an organi-
zanon the principal purposes of which are medical care, education, or research. See
INT. REv. CODE § 3813 (a) These exceptions are taken from INT. REv. CODE §
54(f), which requires informational returns from exempt organizations. See also
SEN. REP. 38, 123.
SProhibitedl transactions are defined in INT. REv. CODE § 162(g) (2) (B) for
trusts and § 3813(b) for organizations exempt under § 101(6).
" 'Family" under INT. REv. CODE §§ 16 2(g) (2) (B) and 3813(b) means the
term family "as defined in § 24(b) (2) (D) " Section 24(b) (2) (D) has a some-
what narrow definition of the term family. "The family of an individual shall in-
dude only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants."
102 "Control" is defined by the Act as "the ownership, directly or indirectly, of 50 per
centum or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
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zation'" to the persons or corporation above listed without adequate se-
curity and a reasonable rate of interest. This measure is less restrictive
than the Clifford regulations in the sense that loans may be made for any
period of time, whereas under the Clifford regulations loans to the grantor
must be for a period of less than twelve months. 5 Loans of this charac-
ter were entirely prohibited in the House Bill.10
The next two proscribed transactions are merely enunciations of prior
law as far as they go. The persons or corporation above listed may not
receive compensation for personal services unless it is reasonable in
amount and is paid for services actually rendered; nor may they receive
services of the organization on a preferential basis. 0 7  There is no reason
why these transactions should be restricted to the grantor or a substantial
contributor, their families and controlled corporations. Cases arising be-
fore the passage of the Act had interpreted Code Section 101(6) to pro-
hibit paying to anyone compensation unreasonable in amount or for
services not actually rendered, and to prohibit services to anyone on a
preferential basis.'08 The payment of unreasonable salaries or the render-
ing of services on a preferential basis was held to violate the requirement
that ". no part of the net earnings [may mure] to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual ," found in all the charitable deduc-
ton and exemption sections. A question may now arise as to whether
the narrower language of the new Act should prevail. A clarifying
amendment seems in order to prevent an interpretation permitting anyone
to receive an unreasonable salary or preferential services.
The Act also forbids an organization to make "any substantial pur-
chase of securities or any other property for more than an adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth," from the grantor or a substantial
contributor, their families or controlled corporations. And in a smilar
vein, the Act prohibits the sale of "any substantial part of [the orgamza-
to vote or 50 per centum or more of the total value of shares of all classes of stock
of the corporation." INT. REv. CODE §§ 16 2 (g) (2) (B), 3813(b)
§§ 321(a), 331(a), H.R. 8920, as passed by the House, June 28, 1950.
Note that in the case of trusts, the prohibited transactions apply only to" in-
come or corpus of the trust which has been permanently set aside or is to be used
exclusively for charitable or other purposes described in [Sec. 162 (a)] " INT.
REv. CODE § 162(g) (2) (B). This restriction was apparently believed necessary
because a trust may have both private and charitable beneficiaries, and yet receive the
benefits of the total charitable deduction under § 162 (a).
' See U.S. TREAs. REGs. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(e) (3)
§§ 321(a), 331(a), H.R. 8920, as passed by the House, June 28, 1950.
1
"INT. REv. CODE §§ 162(g) (2) (B) (ii), (ii); 3813(b) (2),(3), added by Reve-
nue Act of 1950, §§ 321, 331.
' See, e.g., Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 25 F. Supp. 511 (D.C.
Colo. 1938), aff'd. 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 623,
60 Sup. Ct. 378 (1939); Amy Hutchison Crellin, 46 B.T.A. 1152 (1942)
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tion's] securites or other property, for less than an adequate considera-
tion " to such persons or corporations.109  These provisions appear to
mean that an organization may sell a substantial part of its assets to a
large contributor, for example, as long as an adequate consideration is
paid. And, similarly, for a substantial purchase by the organization from
a large contributor: it is permissible if not more than an adequate con-
sideration is paid. It would seem obviously incorrect to interpret these
sections as prohibiting substantial sales or purchases between the organi-
zation and the named persons or corporation as did the corresponding
sections of the House Bill."
Finally, the Act prohibits the grantor or a substantial contributor, their
families or controlled corporations from engaging "in any other transac-
tion which results in a substantial diversion of the [foundation's] income
or corpus "il This paragraph is apparently intended to protect
against improper diversion of funds in ways other than through the sale
and purchase of property."'
The provisions limiting sales and purchases may be questioned as to
the policy behind them in regard to "insubstantial" sales or purchases.
Although the implication may be there, it would seem improper to con-
strue these sections to mean that insubstantial sales or purchases may be
consummated for an inadequate consideration.
As we have noted above, the Act imposes two sanctions for an or-
ganization's engaging in a prohibited transaction: the demal of exemption
to an organization exempt under Section 101(6), or of an unlimited
charitable deduction to a trust under Section 162(a), and the denial of a
charitable deduction to a donor making a gift to the organization or trust.
The orgaruzation's exempt status (or unlimited deduction privilege) is
only affected for the year of its dereliction and following years, with one
exception. The exception occurs where the organization entered into such
prohibited transaction with the intention of diverting income or corpus
from its exempt purpose "and such transaction involved a substantial part
of such corpus or income."1 3 Apparently, if this is the case, exemption
may also be denied for any number of prior years. The Senate Finance
Committee Report gives the illustration of a foundation losing its exempt
status for the taxable years 1955 through 1960 and future years where
the organization was created in 1955 and the prohibited transaction oc-
curs in 1960."1
19 INT. REv. CODE §8 162(g) (2) (B) (iv), (v), 3813(b) (4), (5), added by Reve-
nue Act of 1950, H8 321, 331.Ho§§ 321 (a), 331 (a), H. R. 8920, as passed by the House, June 28, 1950.
"
1INr. Riav. CODE §§ 162(g) (2) (B) (vi), 3813(b) (6), added by Revenue Act
of 1950, § 321, 331.
w See SBN. REP. 123.
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Once it is lost, the privilege of exemption or unlimited deduction may
be regained by filing a claim, under regulations to be issued by the Treas-
ury, in any taxable year following the taxable year in which notice of
denial of exemption was received. The claim for exemption is to be
granted if the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to such regulations, is
satisfied that such organization "will not knowingly again engage in a
prohibited transaction. '11 5 The new privilege of exemption or unlimited
deduction will begin with the taxable year subsequent to the year in
which such claim is filed.
Donors are also denied charitable deductions under appropriate Code
sections for gifts to the organization in the taxable year in which the or-
ganization has lost its exemption or its privilege for an unlimited deduc-
tion."16 Furthermore, the deduction may be disallowed for the year in
which the prohibited transaction occurred, or for prior years, if the donor,
or any member of his family, was a party to a prohibited transaction,
where there was the purpose to divert a substantial part of the organiza-
tion's income or corpus from its charitable activities.117 Apparently here,
as under the previous exemption paragraph, an "intent" to divert for pri-
vate ends must be shown.
3. Accumulatin of Income and Informational Returns.
There might not seem to be a particularly dose relationship between
restricting the accumulation of income by charitable organizations and
requiring them to file public informational returns. But the two matters
may conveniently be considered together because Congress in the 1950
Act attacked the accumulations problem by enacting a generally worded
provision limiting accumulations, and by providing for the filing of pub-
lic informational returns.
As we have noted, prior to the passage of the 1950 Revenue Act, the
Code did not require an exempt organization (or a trust obtaining a com-
plete deduction under Section 162(a), to distribute any of its income.
Aside from the possibility of the attorney-general of the state of its crea-
tion forcing the organization to terminate an unreasonable accumulation,
the organization could refrain from distributing its income for an indefin-
ite period."1 " The problem of accumulation by exempt organizations was
brought to a head by the operations of the Textron organization." 9 Dur-
"' Ibid.
n, SEN. REP. 124. Compare IMT. REV. CODE §§ 275 (a) and 874 (a), settng forth a
general three year statute of limitations.
' INT. REV. CODE §§ 16 2(g) (2) (D), 3813(d).
n'INT. REV. CODE §§ 162(g) (2) (e), 3813(e).
1TWi. And see SEN. REP. 124, 5.
" See Latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. oF PA. L. REv. 617, 650.
'"Note 16, supra.
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ing the period of Textron's spectacular growth, little or no income was
ever distributed to the charitable beneficiaries of its controlled trusts. In-
stead, the income was used for investment purposes beneficial to Textron.
This use of the exemption privilege, together with other previously dis-
cussed uses inimical to the spirit of the "charities" sections of the Code,
prompted proposals for remedial legislation.
Bills were introduced in the first session of the 81st Congress which
would have required exempt organizations to distribute seventy-five or
eighty-five per cent of their gross income for charitable purposes within
the taxable year or shortly thereafter.12 0  As passed by the House, the
1950 Act contained elaborate and complex provisions' 21 taxing accumu-
lated investment income of charitable organizations 122 (as distinguished
from unrelated business income) unless it was distributed within two and
one-half months after the close of the taxable year. Certain exceptions to
the tax were permitted in order that limited types of income accumula-
tions could take place. The tax would not apply to a trust created before
June 1, 1950, the terms of which required the accumulation of income.
An accumulation provision covering property left in trust by will would
also be permitted, but the period of accumulation could not exceed twenty-
five years. An organization could also accumulate, tax-free, an amount
equal to one year's investment income. And, furthermore, an organiza-
tion could create a separate trust to accumulate income for five years if
all of the income and corpus was payable to a specified charitable pur-
pose.1 23
The provision of the House Bill taxing accumulated investment in-
come was eliminated by the Senate Finance Committee and in its place
was substituted a requirement for the filing of informational returns open
to public inspection. 24 The conferees also added to the Act a measure
denying exemption to an organization where its accumulation of income
is unreasonably large, or used for unrelated purposes. 25 Unfavorable
testimony before the Senate committee influenced its decision to make the
inNote 118, supra.
§§ 424, 425, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., as passed by the House, June 28,
1950.
' The provisions were limited to so-called "private" charitable orgamzatons (see
note 99 supra) exempt under INT. REv. CODE § 101 (6), and trusts permitted an un-
limited charitable deduction under INT. REv. CODE § 162 (a)
'=See discussion H.R. REp. 115-123.
4 Revenue Act of 1950, § 341 adding INT. REv. CODE § 153 to the Code; SEN. REP.
34.
3INT. REV. CODE §§ 162(g) (4), 3814; Summary of H.R. 8920 as Agreed to by
the Conferees, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 96 CONG, REc. 1638, 1645-7 (Sept. 22,
1950).
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substitution. The inflexibility of the House measure was rightly criti-
cized.126 For example, a foundation with a relatively small endowment
might depend to a large extent upon annual donations to maintain its ac-
tivities, and, therefore, wish to accumulate the income from the endow-
ment for years when such donations were not sufficient. Its efforts to
accumulate income would be severely restricted by the House Bill. Fur-
thermore, under this measure, an orgamzation could not, in most instances,
set aside a part of its income to endow future operations of its own, or
those of another institution. Nor could a foundation set aside funds
which, if subsequently matched by another organization, would be ap-
plied to a specific project. The five year trust provision was severely
limited in regard both to time and to the fact that a specific use for the
funds must be irrevocably specified in the instrument before income could
be accumulated. 12 7 While the effort to eliminate the abuse of unreason-
able accumulation of income is undoubtedly laudable, the House Bill
might unnecessarily have hampered worthwhile foundation activities. It
would seem that until further study is made, the abuses can be reached
through the measures of the present Act.
As was true of the House measure, the section of the present Act
specifically condemning unreasonable accumulations applies only to "pri-
vate" foundations and trusts -that is, the Act applies to charitable organ-
zations other than those of a religious nature, or educational institutions
with a regular faculty and student body, or institutions devoted to medical
care and research.2 Exemption is denied (or charitable deduction under
Section 162(a) disallowed) if income accumulated in the current or in
prior years is unreasonably large, or is held for an unreasonable period of
time, in view of the organization's exempt purposes. Exemption (or
deduction) is likewise denied if accumulated income is used to a substan-
tial degree for non-exempt purposes, or is invested in such a manner as
to entail risk that the funds will be lost. Exemption is lost only for one
year; a new determination of the factors condemned must be made the
following year.' 29
The section is generally worded and may be criticized for that reason.
But it is difficult to enact anything other than a generally worded pro-
'See, e.g., Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 8920, 81st
Cong. 2nd Sess. 656, 682 (1950).
See SEN. REP. 34 for a list of objections.
' INT. REV. CODE § 3814 applies only to organizations described in INT. REv. CODE
§ 101 (6), to which § 3813 is applicable. Section 3813 applies only to the so-caUed
private charitable organizations. See Note 99, supra. Section 162 (g) (4) applies
stmilar restrictions against the income accumulations of trusts.
' See Summary of H.R. 8920 as Agreed to by the Conferees, 96 CoNG. REc. 1638,
1645-7, (Sept. 22, 1950).
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vision, without producing an inflexible measure, in an area where it is
hard to distinguish between foundations carrying on legitimate charitable
activities and those maintained purely for the personal benefit of persons
controlling the foundation. A generally worded measure places the bur-
den upon the Treasury to administer it conscientiously and yet sympathet-
cally. As we shall see, the provision could undoubtedly be used effec-
tively against the Textron trusts.130  The measure could be sharpened in
regard to specific details, however, without making it inflexible. For ex-
ample, accumulations are disallowed which " are unreasonable in
duration in order to carry out the purpose or function constituting the
basis for such organization's exemption " Assume that a family foun-
dation is chartered for the express purpose of accumulating income for
fifty years, the accumulated income then to be used to erect an expensive
dormitory on a college campus. In the meantime, the family members
act as trustees of the foundation, controlling its investment policies, and,
perhaps, receiving "reasonable" salaries. Presumably, that part of the pro-
vision quoted above would not prevent an accumulation of this nature. A
restriction upon funds for such a length of time does not seem desirable.
Therefore, it is suggested that a reasonable time limitation upon accumu-
lations be added to this provision, requiring a private foundation to dis-
tribute its accumulated income every fifteen or twenty years despite its
charter provision. If the income could not be distributed to the original
beneficiary contemplated in the instrument creating it, then the provision
could require payment to be made to a reasonably related purpose. A
fifteen or twenty year period does not seem an unreasonably short time
within which accumulations must be distributed. It would mean that in-
come must be devoted to charitable purposes roughly within the genera-
tion following the creation of the foundation. The founder of the
Rosenwald Foundation believed that both capital and income should be
distributed within twenty-five years of the organization's creation, and he
wrote this requirement into the charter of the organization he created."3'
Future generations should not be restricted too heavily by the desires of
their forebears. 32
It should be emphasized, in passing, that the problem of improper
accumulation of income, and that of grantor domination of the founda-
tion, are not synonymous. But once grantor control is severely limited,
the accumulation problem assumes less importance.
The second provision attacking the problem of accumulation of in-
"See p. 132, Wra,
'Harrison and Andrews, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 68-9
(1946)1 2 Compare Hobhouse, THE DEAD HAND (1880); Scott, Control of Property by the
Dead, 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 527 (1916).
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come- that is, the provision relating to public informational returns, 8
will serve two purposes. First, public information will encourage distribu-
tions. Second, such information will reveal the extent of the accumula-
tions problem and whether more extensive legislation such as the provision
against accumulations contained in the House Bill is necessary. New
Code Section 153, detailing the information required in returns from
"private" foundations does not introduce a novel idea. Information re-
turns were required by regulations for the taxable years 1941 and 1942,
and have been required by Code Section 54(f) since 1943P'3 The infor-
mation required by the 1950 Act is not much more extensive than that
required under Form 990, promulgated under authority of Section
54(f) '1r Under the new provisions of the Act, however, trusts claiming
a charitable deduction under Section 162 (a) must file an information
return similar to those filed by organizations under Section 54(f)1 36
unless all of the trust's net income for the taxable year is required, under
principals of the law of trusts, to be currently distributed to the bene-
ficiaries. 13 7 And, of course, the Act adds a requirement that the informa-
tion, or at least part of it, be made public. 38
A number of new forms for filing informational returns under the
new Code provisions have replaced former Form 990. Exempt organiza-
tions, except those coming within Section 101 (6), file returns on a new
Form 990. Organizations exempt under Section 101(6) file returns on
Form 990-A, and trusts daiming a charitable deduction under Section
162 (a), on Form 1041-A. Unrelated business net income will be reported
on Form 990-T, which has not yet been promulgated. Turning specifically
to Forms 990-A and 1041-A, they call for most of the same information
which former Form 990 required. A fairly detailed statement of the or-
gamuzation's sources of income, and its disposition of income, must be
given. Expenses and compensation paid must be listed, as well as dis-
tributions of income or capital and the names of donees. A balance sheet
" INT. REV. CODE § 153, added to the Code by Revenue Act of 1950, § 341.
"See U.S. TREAs. REG. 103, § 19.101, as amended by T.D. 5152 (1942); INT.
REv. CODE § 54(f) added by Revenue Act of 1943, § 117.
" For a description of former Form 990, see Latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. oF PA.
L REv. 617, 651.
tm INT. REv. CODE § 153(b).
'This exception to the reporting requirements of trusts was added by Pub. L No.
35 (H.R. 3196), 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., approved May 17, 1951, as an amendment to
INT. REv. CODE § 153 (b). The measure seems reasonable and may encourage the
creation of trusts requiring complete annual distribution of net income to charitable
beneficiaries. Even where all the net income of a charitable trust must be distributed
to beneficiaries, however, unreasonable salaries might still be paid to members of the
settlor's family and the salaries would not be the subject to adequate reporting. For
this reason, the amendment may not prove advantageous.
' INT. R1Ev. CODE § 153 (c).
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for the beginning of the year must be given. And if the organization
holds more than ten per cent of the capital stock in any corporation, the
name of the corporation and a description of the stock must be reported.
The chief new items which the forms require charitable organizations
to disclose are their accumulations of income for the present year, and the
total of their accumulations of income at the beginning of the year. And
Form 990-A requires a "detailed statement" if any compensation has been
paid by the organization to its creator, a contributor, their families or
controlled corporations, or if the organization has bought property from
them, or sold it to them, or has made services available to them, or has
diverted income or corpus to them. This information need not be con-
tained in the part of Form 990-A made available to public inspection.
The Secretary of the Treasury has broad discretion under New Code Sec-
tion 153 in regard to the descriptive matter which the forms filed by charita-
ble organizations must disclose. But there appears no reason why trusts
taking a charitable deduction under Section 162 (a) and filing on Form
1041-A should not have to detail compensation, et cetera, when paid to
the creator, or his family, as do corporations filing on Form 990-A. Nor
is there a reason why this information, in both forms, should not be made
public. In the interests of minimizing family control, public information
of such salaries and other transactions might well be required. Further-
more, there is a question under Secrion 153 whether all information which
the Secretary requires to be filed must not be made public. 39
In fact, the names, relationship, and business association with the foun-
der, of all trustees, officers, and members of any committee controlling
investments of assets and distribution of income should be itemized, and
their compensation separately listed. Furthermore, the foundation's assets
and all major changes in assets during the year should be described. And
these details should be made public information. These steps to broaden
the return could be taken by the Secretary of the Treasury under the au-
thority now given him by Sections 54(f) and 153, and in the interests of
enforcement of the Code, they should be taken.
4. A Consideration of the Objectwes of the 1950 Act and Suggestions
as to Future Legislation.
As we have seen, Congress in the 1950 Act was not interested in legis-
lation directly limiting the charitable activities of any qualified, indepen-
dent charitable organizations. The suggestion of placing a percentage
'INT. REV. CODE § 153(c) states: "The information required to be furnished by
subsections (a) and (b), together with the names and addresses of such organiza-
tions and trusts, shall be made available to the public at such times and in such places
as the Secretary may prescribe." Subsections (a) and (b) list the information
which organizations exempt under § 101 (6) or claiming a charitable deduction un-
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limitation upon the estate and gift tax deduction of charitable donations,
even to private foundations, apparently was not given any serious con-
sideration. Instead, Congress followed rather closely the Treasury's sug-
gestions140 that charitable organizations be denied the privilege of receiv-
ing tax-free income from certain investment activities, and that control
by the creator or his family of a private foundation for their personal wel-
fare, be prohibited. Out of these two fundamental objectives grew the
provisions of the 1950 Act, and it is the intention of the author to con-
sider the effectiveness of those provisions, and possible additions to, or
substitutes for, those provisions in the ensuing pages.
A. Commercial Enterprises and Leaseback Transactions.
It is dear from both the Congressional hearings and the 1950 Act that
the problems presented by exempt organizations in which Congress was
primarily interested were the operation of commercial enterprises by char-
itable organizations and their investment through the sale and leaseback
transaction. And since colleges and universities were the principal chari-
table organizations engaging in these income producing activities, Con-
gressional attention was centered upon educational institutions. It is true,
of course, that private individuals could, before the Act, sell their busi-
nesses to their controlled foundations which, in turn, could pay the pur-
chase price out of tax-free income, and, after the "sale" the seller could
still be in control of the business. But apparently no present examples of
such activities were pressed upon the attention of Congress.' 4'
It is far from dear, however, that Congress placed the correct empha-
sis on the problems presented by exempt organizations. Privately endowed
educational institutions must find new and more promising fields of in-
vestment if they are to remain strong and effective. Private charitable
foundations must be established as independent organizations, freed from
the stigma of being typified as tax avoidance devices, as well as from
their possible use as such devices, if they are to be of real social benefit.
A method was suggested to Congress for preventing charitable organiza-
tions from gaining any undue competitive advantage through the opera-
tion of a commercial enterprise, and yet permitting them to invest in this
new and more promising field, but the plan was given little, if any, at-
tention.1 42
der § 162 (a) must furnish "at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may
prescribe." But an argument could be made that once the Secretary has prescribed
the manner in which information must be filed, the information must be made
public.
See Statement of the Secretary of the Treasury in I Hearings before the House
Ways and Means Committee, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 3, 1950).
' iSee Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938) and related
cases discussed in Latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 617, 631 et seq.
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The merit in this solution is that it takes away the advantage of ac-
cumulating tax-free income and, therefore, most of any claimed competi-
tive advantage which a tax-exempt organization would have over its non-
exempt competitor. The plan is to require the exempt organization which
operates a business to distribute to its charitable purposes the amount that
the foundation would otherwise have to pay in federal income taxes. A
further provision might also be added requiring the distribution from net
income of the equivalent to a reasonable dividend distribution. 143 This
amendment would not allow the exempt organization to accumulate a
larger percentage of its net income than its non-exempt competitors. It
would prevent the exempt organization from buying a business and re-
paying the former owner out of net income at a faster rate than could a
non-exempt purchaser. It would also prevent the exempt orgamzation
from underselling competitors, although there is no evidence that this has
occurred. 4 4  The amendment, furthermore, would take away the advan-
tage of selling a family business to a controlled foundation, because the
foundation could not repay the former owners any more rapidly than
could a non-exempt corporation.
Of course, care would have to be exercised in defining the exempt
organizations to which payments in lieu of taxes might be made. They
could not be merely other controlled foundations of the operating cor-
poration but would have to be qualified, independent charitable organiza-
tions. Closely enforced standards would have to be established, and
probably a list of qualified organizations maintained, by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. But the plan should not be too difficult to formulate,
and it may be the only ultimate answer to financing private charitable
institutions other than through direct government subsidy.
This solution to the problem can apply both to the operation of a
business, and to the sale and leaseback transaction where the purchaser-
lessor borrows money to finance the purchase. The difficulty with the
solution from the charitable organization's point of view is that where the
organization must borrow to purchase the income-producing property,
the organization usually finds it necessary to use most of the income to
repay the loan. 45  If a substantial percentage of this income must be
devoted to charitable activities, exempt organizations will have to use
14
' See testimony of Mr. John Gerdes, Hearings on Proposed Revison of the Internal
Revenue Code, H.R., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 5, 3527 (1947-48)
43 Eaton, supra note 3, 37 VA. L. REV. 253, 282.
'" Indeed, as Mr. Gerdes testified, most colleges and universities need all of the in-
come they can scrape together. See note 142, supra.
4' For example, the indications are that the deal between Allied Stores and the Union
College subsidiary could not have been consummated if the subsidiary had not been
tax exempt. See Cary, supra note 11, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30.
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their own capital, or substantially their own capital, to purchase businesses
or income producing property for investment purposes. This may not be
an unreasonable compromise, however, to ask them to make for the priv-
ilege of experimenting in these new and more promising fields of invest-
ment. Critics of these new investment practices would undoubtedly never
accept anything less than provisions similar to those which we have just
outlined.
The Committee on Financial Support and Taxation of the American
Association of Universities took a different position in a report issued in
April, 1950.146 It believed that a university should not seek tax exemp-
tion for a "feeder organization" operating a commercial or manufacturing
business. But the committee was further of the opinion that a university
should not be subject to tax on any earnings which it might derive from
an operation carried on directly by the university. It was the view of the
committee, however, that the public interest was not being served when
a university directly operated a commercial enterprise having no relation
to the university's educational work. And the committee also thought it
unwise for a university to engage directly or indirectly in a sale and lease-
back transaction in which the university supplied no substantial part of
the purchase price. Thus the committee believed that only "feeder organ-
ations" should be actually subject to tax. And it made the significant
point that taxing these entities would largely solve the problem as far as
universities are concerned. Few boards of trustees, it stated, would be
willing to accept the liabilities involved if businesses were directly oper-
ated by universities.
Of course, the problem of determining sound tax policy is difficult at
best, in this area as in every other. But it does not seem that the complex
provisions of the 1950 Act taxing unrelated business net income form
the most logical or the most desirable answer to the problem. There
seems no reason for penalizing socially useful, independent charitable or-
gamzations by classifying them in the same category as grantor-controlled
foundations, and placing blanket prohibitions on both. To some it seems
sinister for private universities to attempt to survive independent of gov-
ernment aid by seeking wider investment opportunities. And, yet, the
facts are plain. Private universities and colleges cannot carry on their
vast educational programs on private donations alone. If there is nothing
menacing about their holding all of the outstanding securities of a cor-
poration and thereby controlling its policies, there is nothing dangerous
in their attempting to operate the business directly, as long as they are
not permitted an undue advantage over non-exempt competitors. If pri-
14 AssoCIATioN OF AMRIucAN UNivRSITIEs REPORT Or THE COMMITTEE ON
FINANciAL SUPPORT AND TAXATION (April 24, 1950).
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vate businessmen are worried about government control of education, they
should ponder the suggested amendments more carefully.
B. Control of Prvate Foundations by the Creator and His Family.
The problem of control of foundations by their creator, his family,
and business associates, for their private purposes involves a number of
fact situations ranging from a case like that of Textron, Inc., where
charitable trusts were used to aid in a vast expansion program, to a situa-
tion like that planned by the Ford family, where a foundation was utilized
to continue family control of a corporation, to instances where founda-
tions are created as tax-free havens for family savings, and their income
is used to some extent to aid family members, or to enhance family pres-
tge through occasional charitable donations. If private foundations are
to continue to be the source for worthy public benefactions and to serve
as the impetus for new thought and research outside of government di-
rected projects, they must be freed from the possibilities of mampulation
for private ends. Has the 1950 Act accomplished this goal? Let us re-
view the Act from the aspects of the three examples of family control
noted above.
(1). The Textron Situation.
The Textron case must be considered as an aberration in surveying the
general field of charitable organizations. It is an extreme example m that
practically every variety of transaction for which charitable orgamzations
have been criticized was consummated by these trusts. Congress appar-
ently found, however, that in attempting to enact legislation severe enough
to prevent similar use of charitable trusts in the future, it might materi-
ally hamper the flexible operation of charitable organizations of the tradi-
tional type. The result was a considerable amelioration of the scope of
the legislation originally proposed in the House, to the point where only
a few provisions survived which may be effectively used by the Commis-
sioner against a recurrence of the Textron affair.
The principal reason for the tremendous effectiveness of the Textron
trusts, according to Congressional hearings, was that they could accumulate
and reinvest tax-free income without annually distributing the income to the
beneficiaries. Therefore, the early measures introduced to check the op-
erations of these trusts were principally provisions requiring charitable
organizations to distribute a large percentage of their income annually to
charitable purposes. x47 As we have seen, the House version of the 1950
Revenue Act contained an elaborate provision requiring so-called private
charitable organizations to distribute annually substantially all of their net
income. Because of the complexity of the provisions, however, and their
1
.See Latcham, supra note 6, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 617, 650, n. 153.
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general lack of flexibility, the Senate was persuaded to eliminate the sec-
tion and the House conferees concurred after a generally worded substitute
provision was added.14
The substitute provision is specifically aimed at cases like Textron.
And, despite the generality of its language, if the provision is vigor-
ously enforced it could prohibit that manner of using trust funds with-
out endangering proper accumulation of income by all charitable organi-
zations. The section, 4" as noted above, denies exemption for the taxable
year to a so-called "private" charitable orgazation where its accumula-
tions of income from past years, or from the present year, (1) are unrea-
sonable in amount or duration in order to carry out the organization's
charitable purposes; (2) are used to a substantial degree for purposes
other than those constituting the basis of its exempt functions (or deduc-
tion if a trust), or (3) are invested in such a manner as to jeopardize the
performance of its charitable purposes constituting the basis for its ex-
emption, (or its deduction if a trust) The provision applies, of course, to
both charitable corporations and trusts.
The measure will require charitable organizations to persuade the
Bureau of Internal Revenue that their accumulation of income is a reason-
able amount necessary for their exempt activities. Furthermore, they
must show that their investment of income will not jeopardize those ac-
tiities. Clearly in the case of the Textron trusts their large accumulated
incomes and their continued investment of accumulated income in Tex-
tron's ventures could hardly have been so justifiedV9 0 This provision should
give the Commissioner sufficient authority to check such operations as
those involving the Textron trusts. And yet the general language of the
statute requires that it be sympathetically administered so that the legiti-
mate requirements of qualified organizations will not be hampered.
The strengthening of the informational return requirements, while
still not of sufficient breadth, will also tend to hamper further cases like
the Textron affair both by affording additional information to the Com-
missioner and by making the information public knowledge.
It is perhaps ironic that the restrictions in the 1950 Act against trans-
actions between the grantor and his private foundation are not, in them-
.. See discussion p. 124, supra.
1.. There are really two sections, INT. REv. CODE § 3814, applying to orgamzauons
exempt under § 101 (6), and INT. REV. CODE § 162 (g) (4), limiting the charitable
deduction permitted trusts.
" See note 16, supra. The Textron trusts do not provide for the compulsory ac-
cumulation of income, although the trusts provide specific dates when principal and
accumulated income, if any, must be distributed. See Hearings before Subcommittee
of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U. S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 319, 477, 511, 553.
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selves, of sufficient scope to prevent further cases like that of Textron.
The provision containing these restrictions 51 generally denies exemption
where the foundation loans money without adequate security or interest,
or where it sells or purchases property without receiving or giving ade-
quate consideration. But such transactions are prohibited only when
they are between the organization and its creator (if a trust), or person
who has made a substantial contribution, the family of such creator or
person, or a corporation controlled by such creator or person through the
direct or indirect ownership of fifty per cent or more of its voting stock,
or fifty per cent or more of the total value of all classes of its stock. The
Textron trusts entered into very few transactions with their creators, ex-
cept for a small initial contribution or loan by the creator to the trust."'
The sales and purchases of property and securities were between the trusts
and Textron, Inc., or its subsidiaries. Royall Little, who created two of
the trusts, and his family held less than four per cent of Textron's out-
standing stock in 1950.113 Furthermore, three of the trusts were created
by business associates of Little 154 who do not appear to be large holders
of Textron shares or shares of its subsidiaries. In order to prohibit trans-
actions of the Textron variety, the defimtions of control would have to be
much more generally worded. For example, the Code could be rewritten
to prohibit transactions between a charitable organization and another or-
ganization, where one organization or the other "directly or indirectly
controls" the other or they are "under direct or indirect common controL"
And then the issue would revolve around the Commissioner's claim that
from all the facts "direct or indirect control" or "common control" of the
two organizations is proved.155
It appeared from the various Congressional hearings that sales were
made between the trusts and Textron, pr its subsidiaries, for a lesser con-
sideration than the market value of the property, and that loans were made
between them without adequate security.'5" The present Code would not
prevent the consummation of such transactions by organizations similar
to those of the Textron type. If the Commissioner finds that the pro-
vision preventing unreasonable accumulations discussed above is not suf-
'INT. REv. CoDE §§ 3813 and 162(g) (2) (B), discussed supra, p. 118.
"SEN. REP. No. 101, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1949)
' Hearings on Revenue Revsons, 1950, op. cit. supra, note 10 at 553.
" SEN. REP. op. ct. supra, note 151 at 8-10.
'See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 310(b) (3), 53 STAT. 1149 (1939);
In the Matter of J. P. Morgan & Co., 10 S.E.C. 119 (1941), construing, inter alia,
§ 310(b) (3)
See Hearings on Revenue Revisions, 1950, op. ct. supra, note 10 at 506; Hearings,
op. cit. supra, note 149 at 77, 279, 882; SEN. REP., op. cit. supra, note 151 at 8-10,
17
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ficient to prevent operations such as the Textron case, the provision pre-
venting transactions at less than arms length will have to be strengthened
along the above illustrated lines to make them more inclusive.
It should be noted, also, that in some cases Textron trusts engaged in
sale and leaseback transactios 1 57 through borrowing money, or obtaining
credit, from the seller, and that they may have operated commercial enter-
prises. To the extent that income from such leases and business would
be subject to tax under the 1950 Act, these operations would be limited.
But the examples of sale and leaseback and business operations in the
Textron affair would hardly justify taxing all sale and leaseback transac-
tions and business activities as the present Code does.
(2). Protection of the Family Corporation.
The House version of the 1950 Act would have denied a charitable
income, estate, or gift tax deduction for a gift of stock to a foundation
where the donor or his family controlled both the foundation and the cor-
poration which issued the stockY s The evident purpose behind the pro-
vision was to prevent members of a family from escaping or minimizing
estate tax by bequeathing stock in a family owned corporation to a family
controlled foundation. If the stock is left to the foundation it is not sub-
ject to estate tax, and yet the family can continue to control the corporation
by their domination of the foundation which holds the stock. If the
stock is included in the decedents gross estate, part of it may have to be
sold to pay estate tax and, therefore, outsiders may gain a minority, or
perhaps, majority interest in the corporation.
In order for the gift of stock to be denied a charitable deduction under
the House Bill, either the contributor or his family must have comprised
a majority of the trustees, officers, or directors of the foundation, or have
had a right to fill vacancies in a majority of such offices, or have retained
the right to vote or dispose of such stock. Moreover, the stock had to be
stock in a corporation in which the contributor, his family, or both, owned
at least fifty per cent of the voting stock, or fifty per cent of the value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation. Both of these, control of the
foundation and the corporation, had to be present to deny a charitable
deduction 59
The House report was of the opinion that this provision was necessary
to prevent tax avoidance.'80 But the Senate Finance Committee did not
concur and struck out the measure. The Senate report stated that out-
weighing tax avoidance in the view of the Committee" is the fact that
'See Hearings, op. cit. supra, note 149 at 538-9; SEN. REP. op cit. supra, note 151
at 17
SSection 331, HL 8920, as passed by the House June 23, 1950.
'' Ibid.
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if these deductions are not allowed still larger funds would be lost to pri-
vate charity."'' The House conferees receded.
0 2
There was no evidence presented to the Congressional committees
that this type of tax avoidance is presently a serious problem. Undoubt-
edly the wills of Henry and Edsel Ford present the most spectacular in-
stances of this type of avoidance technique. In this case, Ford Motor
Company stock was split into two classes: class B voting stock having a
relatively small value, and class A non-voting stock representing 90 per
cent of the total equity interests in the Ford Motor Company.6 3 Both
Henry and Edsel Ford bequeathed their class B voting shares to surviving
family members, and most of their class A to the family controlled Ford
Foundation. The estate tax upon their separate estates was nominal
compared to what it would have been if the class A stock had been in-
cluded in their gross taxable estates. And the Ford family continued to
control the Ford Motor Company.0 4 The House Bill provision would
have prevented any tax advantage in these transfers by denying an estate
tax charitable deduction to the estates of Henry and Edsel Ford. 5
If there is an avoidance problem here, it arises through possible family
domination of the foundation. One way to prevent it is through tighten-
ing the Code "charities" provisions against unjustified family control. If
this method does not prove effective against recurring instances of this
technique, then a provision similar to that in the House Bill should be
adopted. Certainly this avoidance method should not be permitted in
order that the family corporations may be "saved" from the inroads of the
estate tax. If this is a real problem,' 06 it should be carefully investigated
and adequate measures taken for general relief.
10 H. R. REP. 131. The Minority Report recommended that action on this provision
.await an opportunity to explore this important problem and its ramifications more
fully."
1 SEN. REP. 39.
1
' H.R. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1950).
See FORTUNE, Aug., 1947, p. 108, col. 1; NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1947, p. 70; N. Y.
Times, April 22, 1947, p. 29, col. 8; April 20, 1947, Sec. 4, p. 8, col. 2; April 19,
1947, p. 1, col. 4; The Modern Philanthropc Fouodation: a Critique and a Proposal,
59 YALE L. J. 477, 499 (1950)
'Of a total of 172,645 Class B voting shares, and 3,280,255 Class A shares, the
Foundanon owns 3,082,949 Class A shares. NEWSwEEK, May 5, 1947, p. 71.
" Of course, the family would still control the Company because the members hold
all the Class B voting stock. But Class A stock would probably have had to be sold
to pay estate tax. See BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 13, 1948, p. 24.
' See Harriss, Estate Taxes and the Family-Owned Business, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 117
(1950) See also INT. REV. CODE § 115(g) (3), added to the Code by Revenue
Act of 1950, § 209, purporting to give relief to family corporations by making the
provisions of INT. REV. CODE § 115 (g) inapplicable where a corporation redeems
stock held by an estate and more than 50 per cent of its assets consisted of the corpo-
ration's stock. The relief provision is limited to the amount of death taxes which the
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(3). Other Problems of Family Control.
As we have seen, the 1950 Act still permits the creator of a founda-
tion and his family to sell property to the foundation, and to buy property
from it, in arms length transactions.167  They may also borrow money
from the foundation if they provide adequate security and pay a reason-
able rate of interest. Members of the creator's family, or the founder
himself, may still be employees of the foundation, drawing salaries. And,
more important, the creator and his family may be trustees, directors, or
officers controlling foundation policy. Should the creator and his family
(or others he might dominate, for that matter) be permitted to engage
in these transactions with the foundation, or remain in a controlling posi-
ton?
The goal which Congress seems to have had in mind originally in ex-
empting private charitable foundations, and certainly which it was striv-
ing for in the 1950 Act, is that of an independent, charitable orgamzation
carrying on socially useful work for the public welfare. This is a great
ideal and one worthy of striving for. Assuredly it is not being accom-
plished as long as wealthy taxpayers may use foundations as havens for
tax avoidance.
Permitting the creator and his family to transact sales and purchases
at arms length with the foundation does not necessarily destroy that goal.
As a matter of fact, there may be situations where the creator is the only
person who will purchase certain frozen assets from the foundation at a
fair price. For example, the foundation may hold securities in a family
owned business which do not have a ready market, but which the creator
or members of his family might be willing to buy because of their interest
in the family corporation. As long as the transactions are at arms length,
and adequately reported to the Bureau, there seems no reason for not per-
mitting them. The same is probably true of reasonable salaries paid to
family members for work actually performed. If salaries of a similar
amount would have to be paid anyway, no great difficulty seems to be
present.
Less can be said for permitting the creator and his family to borrow
from the foundation, even for adequate consideration and reasonable in-
terest. Any transaction between the foundation and the creator, or his
family, raises the possibility that foundation funds are being used for per-
sonal rather than charitable purposes. It seems that such transactions
estate must pay. On its face, the section is not limited to stock in family corpora-
tions. It encourages the retention of securities until death that might better be sold.
A more comprehensive and better reasoned answer than this section will have to be
found. (Revenue Act of 1951, § 320, reduces the 50 per cent requirement noted
above to 35 per cent.)
" INT. Rv. CODE §§ 3813, 162 (g) (2) (B).
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should not be permitted unless there exists a reason which may benefit
the foundation. The foundation would not seem to gain in any material
way by making such loans. The money could always be invested else-
where. And repayment of loans to the family, even though supported by
adequate security, and for reasonable interest, may be difficult to enforce
for obvious reasons. The provision permitting the creator and his family
to borrow from the foundation should be eliminated.
The right of exclusive control in the hands of the creator and his
family, however, is something of a different nature. This is the heart of
the problem. For it depends upon the trustees, directors, or other con-
trolling officers to determine whether a foundation shall have an inde-
pendent, dynamic program, or whether it will merely be a source of pre-
serving family funds from the inroads of income and transfer taxes. Trus-
tees chosen entirely from members of the creator's family, or their inti-
mate social or business associates, may, nevertheless, produce a program
for the foundation of vital social significance. But the chances are much
smaller that such a program will be developed under the leadership of
such a group than if the trustees have a more diversified background.
Some method should be determined for encouraging, if not requiring,
tax-exempt, private foundations to place independent, qualified persons
on their boards of trustees, and in other policy making positions.168 A
number of community foundations attempt to achieve this goal by pro-
viding in their charters that a certain number of their trustees must be
chosen by prominent members of the community such as the mayor, the
probate judge, and so forth. 16 9
Perhaps a provision could be added to the Code to require that a pri-
vate charitable foundation have a certain number of qualified, indepen-
dent trustees, or directors, (not necessarily a majority) before it can
qualify as an exempt organization. This would not necessarily be an as-
surance that the foundation would strive for socially beneficial goals. But
it would mean a step in that direction -perhaps all that can be done
through amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. The next step would
have to be made through campaigns by such bodies as educational groups,
learned societies, and associations of artists and musicians to encourage
foundation trustees to appoint scholars, artists, and musicians, for example,
to their boards, so that an invigorated, independent program could be
encouraged.
"6 See, e.g., the policy of the Ford Foundation of appointing Paul G. Hoffman presi-
dent of the foundation, and Robert C. Hutchins, and C. C. Davis, associate directors.
N. Y. Times, November 7, December 20, 1950, pp. 19, 20, cols. 1, 2. See also N. Y.
Times, October 1, 1950, pt. IV, p. 7, col. 5.
"See Chambers, CHARTERS OF PHILANTHROPIES 18, 19 (1948); Harrison and
Andrews, AmERiCAN FOUNDATION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 32 (1946)
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